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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THI STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN S. DALTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
WAYNE RASMUSSEN COMPANY, and 
GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Defendants and Respondents. 
! ! Case No. 8943 
i ) 
PETITION lQft REHEARING 
The Wayne Rasmussen Company and 
Guarantee Insurance Company, defendants and 
responde~ts herein, respectfully petition this 
Honorable Court for a rehearing and reargument 
in the above entitled case. The petition is 
based upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DALTON WAS 
AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT OBER-
HANSLY V. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPAlr! WAS 
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CONTROLLING. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION OF 
THE COMl'USSION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
IN REVERSING ITSELF WITHOUT TAKING ANY ADDI-
TIONAL EVIDENCE. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants and res-
pondents, petitioners herein, pray that the 
judgment and opinion of the court be re-
examined and a reargument permitted of the 
entire case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY • QUINilEY & NEBEKER 
GRANT C • .UDNESEN 
STEPHEN B • NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I, Stephen B. Nebeker, one of the 
attorneys for the defendants and respondents, 
do hereby certify that I have carefully examined 
and considered the foregoing petition for re-
hearing, know the contents thereof, and that in 
- 2 -
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my opinion the same is well founded in point 
of law and is not made for the mere purpose 
of delaying the determination of said eause. 
STEPHEI~ B • NEBEKER 
ARGUMDT 
POil~T I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DALTON 
WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. 
The court, in its opinion in the in-
stant case, states that because the commission 
was n* * * laboring under a misapprehension as 
to the holding of this court in Oberhansly v. 
Travelers Insurance ComRany, 5 Utah 2d 1.5, 295 
P.2d 1093, the award must be vacated." The 
Industrial Commission finally found that Dalton 
was not an employee of the defendant, Wayne 
Rasmussen Company, but that he was either a 
volunteer or an independent contracto~ (R. 96) 
(Italics ours). This court has completely 
ignored the Commission's conclusion that if 
Dalton was not a volunteer then he must of 
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necessity have been an independent contractor. 
Even if the Commission was laboring 
under a misapprehension as to this court's 
holding in the Oberha.nsly case, suprA, this 
court must still determine if the final order 
of the commission denying compensation is valid 
on the ground that Dalton was an independent 
contractor. This court has repeatedly announced 
that it is committed to the right to control 
test in determini:rt.g whether a workm.an is an 
employee or an independent contractor. Respond-
ent, in its initial brief, argued that under the 
right of control 'test, Dalton was clearly an 
independent contractor at the time he was injured. 
Respondent does not wish to burden this cou.rt 
by repeating the argument and citation of author-
ities contained in Point I of 1ts brief. Suffice 
it to sa.y that the right to control the driver 
of an automobile depends upon whether the employer 
has the right to control the when, where and how 
o.f the operation of the vehicle. It is obvious 
that the Wayne Rasmussen Company did not have 
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the right to control when Dalton returned to 
Ogden, where he. drove the car and how he drove 
"whether slow or fast, behind or around traffic• 
inside or outside the lane of traffic, etc.• 
See fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, .56 P.2d 1049. 
!he statutory definition of independ-
ent contractor contained in 35-1-42, u.c.A. 
195.3 states: 
•* * * .. !he term 'independent 
contractor,' as herein used, is 
,defined. to be any person, associa-
tion or corporation engaged in the 
performance· of any work for an-
other, who, while so engaged, is 
independent of the employer in all 
that pertains to the execution of 
the -v;ork, is not subject to the 
rule or control or the employer, 
is engaged only in the performance 
o£ a definite job or piece of work, 
and is subordinate to the employer 
only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's 
design.• 
Dalton was clearly an independent 
contractor as that term has been defined by the 
Utah Legislature. He was not subject to the 
rule or control of the employer, was engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job md 
- l:i -
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was subordinate to his employer only in 
effecting a result. 
In its opinion in the case at bar, 
this cou:rt states: 
"* * * (T)he evidence was 
clear that the $25.00 less the 
price of the bus tiekets was to 
be compensation .for the job." (Itaiics ours] 
This court has previously held that the manner 
and basis of payment is one element to be used 
in determining whether there is_an employer-
employee relationship. Stover Bedding Co. v. 
Industrial Commission~ 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 
1027. Even if Dalton did receive some compensa-
tion for his 'WOrk, this fact does not make him 
an employee. On the contrary, the lump sum 
a4~~~e payment to Dalton and Porter confirms 
Respondents contention that he was an independ-
. );</' \ ' /ej!ft contractor. An independent contractor is 
/np~lly paid on a job basis rather than a 
- t .. · '" 
·~,hourly..._or weekly scale. The fact that Dalton 
' ,, .·,: 
arid Porter received $25.00 to bring two cars 
b&!;k ,:eo Ogden is consistent with the manner cf 
' 
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payment to an independent contracter. The 
final order of the Commission stated, in sub-
stance, that if the money Dalton received was 
expense money. then he would be a volunteer; 
but if the money received wl!uJ compeusatien. 
then Dalton would be an independent contractor. 
In any event, he was not an employee, subject 
to the right of control of the Wayne Rasmussen 
Company. 
The final order of the Commission 
denying compensation is correct because D~~on 
was an independent contractor at the time he 
was injured. Thi$ court erred in failing to 
find that if Dalton was not a volunteer, as 
that term is used in the Oberhallsly case, supra, 
then he must have been an ind.epandent contractor. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 10 HOLD THAT OBim-
HANSLY V • TRAVELERS !)lSUlANCI COMPANY WAS 
CONTROLLING • 
In reviewing a case appealed to this 
- .., -
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court from the Industrial Commission~ this 
court has repeatedly held 1:h at the findings of 
the commission will not be disturbed in the 
absence of capricious or arbitrary action. In 
the opinion in the instant case, this court 
stated: 
•* * * In fact there is no 
evidence .from vllrlch it could 
reasonably be.· found that plain-
tilt volunte-ered to take the trip 
and a:rive back a car for no re-
muneratiQn. Beitner.the plaintiff 
nor the comxanyis representative 
so testil'ie • There was no evia-
en-ce ··of ;any reiatfonsni£ between 
the Eartles to make sue a conplu-
sion reasonable. On the contr§!fY 
the evidence was clear that the 
$25.00 less the price of the bus 
tickets was to be. compensation for 
the job·'' (Italics ours) 
There is evidence in the record from 
which the commission could have found that. Dalton 
v-olunteered to take the trip and drive back a car 
for no remuneration. 
Purkey, office manager and bookkeeper 
for the Porter Dalt,on Partnership and the Wayne 
Rasmussen Company, testified that when Dalton 
was informed that two cars were in Rock Springs 
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he volunteered •Well •. J1! will .. go get th~· 
(Italics ours) (R. 49). Mr. Purkey was present 
during the conversation between Naylor arid 
Dalton relative to picking up the cars <m4 he 
recalled the incident as te11olfS: 
")ir. Naylor had these two 
ears up there and be thought that 
he had some other parties to go 
get them. Well, I believe it was 
Friday afternoon or Saturday morn-
ing. I can't remember which,. that 
these other parties called him up 
and said they couldn 't go. So Mr. 
Naylor was·worried about who he 
eould get and I believe that Jack: 
eame up. Mr. Dalton eame up into 
the parts or to the front of the 
office and Mr. Baylor told him 
that he had these two cars there,. 
and Mr. Dalton said, ttviell. ~~e 
will &o s;et.them.• I don't remem-
ber just wlien 'tnat was, whether 
that was Friday or S:aturday, but 
anyway the arrangem:ents was made 
that they shottld go t«!t them and 
I was to five them a cheek for $25.00." · R. 49-50). (Italics. ours) 
Dalton t.estiiied that ~aslor asked 
him to go to Rock Springs to ge·t the cars. His 
statement is in direct conflict w.lth Purkeyts 
testimony. Obviously there is evidence in the 
record from which the comm,ission C(ruld. have 
found that Dalton volunteered to take the trip 
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for no remuneration. In view o:t these conflict-
ing statements, can it be said that the eommis,.-
sion acted arbitrarily or capriciously in 
believil'lg the testimony ot Purkey who had no 
financial inte-rest in the outcome o~ the pro-
ceedings ratther than Dalton, whose t$Stimony 
would obviously be influenced by h1~ financial 
interest? 
,.here is additional evidene,e in the 
record to support the eoadssionts finding 
that Dalton volunt-eerecl to get the cars for no 
remuneration. Porter# Dalton's partner, testi-
fied that he told his wife bewas going to Roek 
Springs to look !or a new car when in fact u(w)e 
were going out on a binge.•• Porter te$tified 
as follows-: 
•we went on several trips 
and it was easy to tall my.wife 
we were going to look at a tJar 
if we were going to_so·out on a 
binge. And'that's thetruth or 
it •. " (R. 65). 
Purkey's statement that Dalton volun-
teered •Well. we will go get them• and Porter's 
st.tement that they were going out on ;!!_!?_inge; . 
s;f' ' 
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support the eommissionts finding that Dalton was 
a volunte-er. In view of this substantial evid-
ence,. the co:rmnission 11as compelled to find that 
Dalton was a volunteer. It clearly was .~ 
unreasonable for the Co-mmission 'teo have found 
that Dalton was not an employee, in the ordinary. 
meaning of the term,. or under the irlorkmen •s 
Compensation Act, for he was either a volunteer 
or an indeP!ndent, contractor. (Italic.s ours}. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIOri OF 
THE COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN 
REVERSI~G ITSELF WITliOUT T.AIUNG ANY ADDITIONAL 
EVIDE~JCE. 
The Industrial Commission initiallz 
found that the applicant Sherman Dalton was an 
employee of the Wayne Rasmussen Company at the 
time of his injury and that he v;~s ·entitled to 
compensation. Within thirty days after writte-n 
notice of the decision, the Wayne Rasmussen Gorn-
pany and Guarantee Insurance Company filed a 
petition for rehearing. The petition for crehear-
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ing asked the commission to redetermine the 
question cf whether or not there was a contract 
of employment existing betw·een the plaintiff 
and defendant~ and if' the m•dical expenses in-
curred by the applicant were reasonable. The 
petition for rehearing was granted. The order 
granting the rehearing stated: 
urt is ordered that the 
request for rehearing filed 
herein by def'endantts attorney 
on the 12th day of November, 
1957, be and the same is hereby 
granted.• 
This court has previously held that 
the effect of granting a rehearing is to vacate 
and set aside the prior orde:r or judgment of 
the commission and requires tha~ the case be 
tried anew. See Carter v. Industrial Cprr411ission, 
76 U. 520; 290 P.776, Laws v. Industrial Commissior 
116 u. 4)2, 21~ P.2d 194. 
At the rehearing the commissioner 
stated that it was a hearing de £2!Q and that 
he assumed that the parties were willing to 
stipulate that the transcript of the prior pro":: 
- 12 ...__ 
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eeedings could be received in evidence. Bot.h 
parties so stipulated. Evidenee was then intro-
duced eonee.rning the medical expenses incurred 
by the applicant. Af't§ir the rehearing the 
cornmission reve:rsed i't:s former order and found 
that the app~icant was not an employee but was 
either a volunteer or an independent ·contractor. 
This action was taken by the commission before 
the initial ord.er had become final. Mter the 
commission had entered i'ts order denying com-
pensation t}.le app~icant filed a petition for 
rehea~ng. This petition for rehearing was 
denied. The order deny.in& compensation then 
became the :final order of the e.onmdssion. The 
applicant appealed to this court from that order. 
In the concluding paragraph or its 
opinion this eottrt stated: 
•we appreciate that, the 
Commission has.the prerogativ• 
of making the determination or 
faets which will not be disturbed 
in the absence of capricious or 
arbitrary action. Howeve.r, due 
to the fact that on the rehearing 
no new evidence was presented, a 
complete about faee would be so 
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inconsistent as to eompel us-to 
reverse the second. order.• 
\faa the action taken by the commiasion 
in reversing itaelf without taking any additional 
evidence so arbitrary or e.aprleious as to reutuire 
a reversal or its decision? 
ThiJ:t eaurt is saying that if the com-
mission grant.s a rehearing. whieb ~ taeto 
vacates the prior order, it cannot reviel'l the 
facts and law and corre-ct wllat it believes to 
be a previous erroneoua order.·· Is the Industrial 
Commission~ an administrative body, to be h.eld 
to a more rigid eo de o.f pro eed't'lre than a trial 
court? Under the Ut.ah Rules of Civil Procedure 
a trial eour-t is given the prerogative of chang-
ing its mind be.for·e a judgment becomes final as 
evidenced by Rule 50(b) 1 where a judge may grant 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and Rule 
59(b)(7) where b• may grant a new trial when 
there is error in law. It aeem.s inconceivable 
that this cotu•t would. say that the commission's 
actions were arbitrary or capricious because on 
rehearing it carefully revi<twed the testimony 
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submitted at the first hearing and. studied th~ 
memoranda filed by counsel and concluded that 
the first order was in error and sheuld be 
vacated. (R. 96) Is the commission now to be 
precluded from r,eviewing the record of a fi:,t:tst 
hearing when it has granted a r-ehearing for that 
express purpose? Must the commission let an in-
correct order stand and force the parties to go 
to the expense o:f appealing to this court to have 
the order corrected? This doctrine violates the 
basic principles of administrative law. The 
Utah Legis1atur-e has stated that the commission 
is not to be bound by any technical or formal 
rules of procedure (35-l-SS u.c.A. 1953). The 
holding of this court now elevates the commission 
to a position or greater dignity than that en-
joyed by a trial court, that is. that it can 
never revers$ itself unless it hears new evidence. 
Once the order of the commission becomes final 
then the aggrieved party may petition this court 
for a writ of certiorari, a:nd. the final order 
of the commission is the order appealed. In 
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determining whether the commission has ac'tett 
arbitrarily or capriciously. this court has 
announced the following rule: 
•In the ease o£ denial of 
compensation, the record must 
disclose that there is material, 
substantial, competent~ uneontra-
dic'ted evidence sufficient to 
make a disregard o! it justify 
the conclusion., as a matter of 
law., that tbe Industrial Commis-
sion arbitrarily and capriciously 
disregarded the evidence or un-
reasonablyre.fused to believe such 
evidence.• 
Kent v. Industrial ~ssion, 89 u. 
381, 57 P.2d 724• · &ee also opinion o:f Mr. 
Justice Wolf:e in Norris v. Industt'ial Commission_. 
90 U. 256, 61 P.2d 413 .. 
In the case at bar. this court stat~d. 
that the eommiss,ion acted arbitrarily because 
it reversed itself without takinc.any additional 
evidence. This holding fails to rEH:ognize that 
until an order becomes .final the commission may 
try the case anew and. make an order or judgment 
in lieu of the displaced .former order or judg-
ment. See Carter v. Industrial Commission. 76 u • 
... / 
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520, i:9b P. 776, where this court said: 
"When a ease on merits is 
fully heard and tried by the com-
mission and on due consideration 
an order is made or judgment ren-
dered on merits, the commission 
ought not grant a rehearing or 
further hearing though timely and 
properly applied for, except on 
averments or a showing of suffi-
X~ent grounds or good cause 
therefor. When sueh is not 
reasonably or satisfactorily 
made to appear, the application 
for a rehearing or further hear-
ing should be denied. Wh•n, 
how.ever. sueh is made to appear 
on a timely ll!!Ellcation made 
therefore. and when an unrestricted 
rehearing of the case on merits is 
£ante<IcL the co!m:!ssion must under-
Stand tnat the order theretofore 
made or jud.fWient.rendered is dis-
placed and vaeated and that it then 
becomes itcs legil d:tttt tg again 
hear ana try the cause anew and make 
an order or rend- r a ud .· ent in 
ieu of the dis aced former order 
or ud ent. n suc1 case · it be 
so a vise , ~t may a opt the prior 
findino-s made if in its ud ent 
t ey sufficiently ref ect al of the 
material facts as aisclosed by the 
evidence, and make a nel-l order or 
render a new =ud ment accordin 1 -..w.,..h·e~t.,...._e_r~i~t~b-e~t-o~t-=-h--e--..s·am··-e.........,o"'""r;.;;;;;;.;;:~l.r.;;;;f~~r-
ent effect than was the first or 
displa.cea order or ,iudgment.ii (Italics oursJ 
The question be.fore this court in cases 
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arising under the Worlanen's Compensation Act 
is whether there is sufficient evidence in 
the record to support the findings of the 
Commission. This court should look at the 
final order of the commission and see if that 
order is supported by the facts. Until the 
order of the Commission is final. there is 
nothing that is reviewable and once it becomes 
final it should be the only order reviewed. 
In Carter v. Industrial Commission, supra, this 
court said that the granting of the rehea:rir1g 
takes from the employer whatever right he had 
to apply to the Supreme Court for a review for 
the reason that the granting of the rehearing 
leaves the cause with no final judgment or order 
subject to review. The Commission may have 
granted any number of rehearing;s for the purpose 
or correcting an error in law, taking new evid-
ence or modifying a previous award, but the final 
award is the order which is appealed and is sub-
ject to being affirmed or vacated. 
There is nothing in the Workmen's 
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Compensation Act which requires the Industrial 
Commission to take new evide:nce on a rehearing 
before it ean reverse itself'. It would seem 
tha~ the intent of the Legislature in giving 
the Commission the right to rehear a matter 
would be to give it a ehanee to revie-w the evid-
ence and the law to be certain that the order 
of the commission was correct. 
This Supreme Court also has the right 
t.o grant a rehearing where it has failed to 
consider some material point or has erred in 
its conclusions. The Industrial Commission 
may also err in one of its conclusions and 
should have the right to eor-rect it without the 
submission of new evidence. Until the order of 
the commission be,eomes final it is subject to 
change on a petition for rehearing .... The commis-
sion has the right and the duty to change an 
order if it is convinced the order is in error. 
CONCLUSIOlJ 
This court has failed to consider 
whether the Commission's final order - that Dalton 
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was either a volunteer or an independent eon.i.l 
tractor is supported by the evid,ence. This court 
has failed to apply the right to control test 
which is axiomatic in Utah Workmen's Compensation 
eases. Applying the right to control test it is 
self-evident that the Wayne Rasmussen Company 
did not have the right to control Dalton in the 
manner and method in which he drove the ear. 
If, as :lin the case at bar. the record 
is conflicting and the commission has resolved 
the issues in favor of one party, then the 
commission's final order should not be vacated. 
As stated by this court in the opinion in the 
instant ease. the eomntission has the duty to find 
the facts and those .findings will not be disturbed 
unless the Commission has acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously. This court erred in holding that 
the Oberhansly case, supra, was not controlling 
because there is substantial evidence in the 
record which supports the commission's finding 
that Dalt-on volunteered to drive the cars back 
to Ogden._ 
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It is obvious that neither the appli-
cant nor the defendant acquire a vested interest 
in an order .of the commission until it becomes 
final, and even then the order is subject to 
review by this court. As long as the commission 
does not violate the statutes .or rudimentary 
requirements of fair play, its procedure should 
not be condemned. That this was the intent of 
the Legislature is apparent from 35-1-88 U .c .A. 
1953. This. court erred in holding that the 
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously in reversing itself without taking 
additional evidence. 
For the foregoing reasons defendant 
respectfully requests this court to grant a re-
hearing to correct its conclusions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINrna & NEBEKER 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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